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Abstract 12 
There has been increased interest in trade policy following the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) European Union (EU) 13 
membership referendum. However, relatively little scholarly analysis has been produced on how Brexit will affect EU 14 
trade policy. Instead, the received wisdom has been that Brexit will shift the EU’s trade policy position in a less 15 
liberal direction. This is based on a ‘static’ analysis where the UK variable is simply ‘taken out of the figurative 16 
equation’ determining EU trade policy. We argue that this neglects the potential role of more ‘dynamic’ effects.  17 
First, the negotiations to determine the nature of the EU-UK future economic partnership are likely to involve a 18 
lengthy process with a still uncertain, and possibly evolving, destination. The outcome and process of arriving there 19 
will influence how economic operators and policymakers adapt their preferences and behaviour, including through 20 
possible relocation and the formation of new alliances. This will shape EU trade policy in potentially counterintuitive 21 
ways. Second, the absence of clear material structures from which actors can ‘read’ their interests highlights the 22 
importance of considering the role of ideas and political framing. How the vote for and consequences of Brexit are 23 
interpreted will likely shape what is considered an appropriate policy response. Examining EU trade policy since the 24 
Brexit vote, the paper finds that rather than push the EU in a more illiberal direction, the referendum result has 25 
been used to reinforce the European Commission’s external liberalisation agenda. The discursive response to Brexit 26 
and Donald Trump has been to portray the EU as a champion of free trade in an era of global populism. 27 
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1. Introduction 33 
Trade policy has been a central focus of academic and policy debates concerning the consequences of Brexit. 34 
However, existing analyses have primarily concentrated on the shape of the future European Union (EU)-United 35 
Kingdom (UK) trade and economic relationship and the challenges facing the UK as an independent trade policy 36 
actor (e.g. Hestermeyer & Ortino, 2016; Trommer, 2017). Where there has been a consideration of the impact of 37 
Brexit on EU trade policy, the conventional wisdom has been that the loss of a pro-liberalisation Member State will 38 
push the EU in a more ‘protectionist’ direction. For example, a recent Chatham House research paper on 39 
transatlantic trade relations invokes ‘internal fissures within the EU’ between pro-liberalisation and more defensive 40 
Member States. It argues that the ‘loss of a significant pro-free-trade voice within the bloc […] also has 41 
consequences for the EU’s ability to speak with one voice in [ongoing] negotiations with the US’ (Schneider-42 
Petsinger, 2019, pp. 18-19).  43 
Such assessments assume that EU trade policy can simply be analysed as a function from which the UK ‘variable’ can 44 
be removed (see Jensen & Snaith 2018, p. 255). They have taken the UK’s historical record as a liberal Member State 45 
and concluded that Brexit will shift EU trade policy in a more protectionist direction. We see this as being a ‘static’ 46 
analysis in two senses, drawing on understandings of the term in economic analysis (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, this 47 
issue). Firstly, static can refer to the underlying assumption that the preferences and behaviour of relevant actors in 48 
response to Brexit remain unchanged. Secondly, and analogous to comparative static analysis, existing accounts 49 
have compared pre- and expected post-Brexit equilibria without examining the adjustment path itself. In our view 50 
this remains an incomplete view of the effects of Brexit, even if one were to change the parameters of static analysis 51 
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by, for example, adjusting the degree to which the UK was a liberal presence within the EU. In arguing for a more 52 
dynamic account, we consider not only general adjustments in the behaviour of relevant actors but also specifically 53 
those resulting from the political process of negotiating the UK’s exit. We also argue that these actors’ preferences 54 
and strategies are significantly influenced by the way in which the causes and consequences of the Brexit vote are 55 
discursively constructed.   56 
This all follows from the emphasis we place in the next section on seeing the negotiation of EU-UK trade 57 
arrangements as a process with an indeterminate and uncertain end point. After critically discussing in section 3 58 
how a static analysis might assess the impact of Brexit on the EU’s trade policymaking institutions, market power 59 
and configuration of societal interests, section 4 considers how this needs to be overlaid with an appreciation of how 60 
institutional and societal actors are likely to adjust their behaviour in response to different Brexit outcomes and their 61 
negotiation. Contrary to expectations, a harder Brexit may in fact not strengthen the relative position of 62 
protectionist interests in the EU given that pro-liberalisation UK-based businesses will be more probable to relocate 63 
to the EU27. Even under a soft Brexit, which is more likely to lead to a shift in the interest constellation in EU trade 64 
policy as UK-based firms are less likely to relocate but cease being represented by the EU27, continued high levels of 65 
interdependence between EU27 and UK firms might mean pro-liberalisation interests retain influence over EU trade 66 
policy. The absence of clear material structures from which actors can unproblematically ‘read’ their material 67 
interests also puts a premium on the role of ideas in shaping responses to Brexit (Blyth, 2002; De Ville & Siles-68 
Brügge, this issue). Section 5 therefore considers the discursive battle over the interpretation of the referendum 69 
result that has taken place since the referendum. It finds that Brexit has counterintuitively reinforced the EU’s liberal 70 
trade policy orientation over this period. Section 6 concludes. 71 
2. Uncertainty over the Future Economic Partnership 72 
As noted in the Introduction to this Special Issue, the shape of the post-Brexit UK-EU economic arrangement is yet to 73 
be determined. Not only are several potential outcomes still in play but there is also a potentially lengthy and 74 
unstable process of arriving there. This might entail a transition and activation of the Irish ‘backstop’ as well as a 75 
further extension of Article 50. Two extensions have already been granted at the time of writing (July 2019), with the 76 
latest lasting until the end of October 2019. While these ‘temporary’ outcomes may themselves also become more 77 
permanent than intended (see Henig, 2018), they are still likely to be politically unstable given divisions within the 78 
UK and EU on the future state of relations. These are most clearly evidenced by UK cabinet battles over whether to 79 
align with the EU regulatory and customs regime and Member State disagreements over granting the UK an Article 80 
50 extension.  81 
 82 
As a result, the future economic partnership needs to be thought of not only in terms of the degree of economic 83 
integration it implies between the EU27 and the UK, but also in respect of its stability. The latter is understood here 84 
simply in terms of the expected longevity of the agreement and its degree of institutionalisation, in other words: 85 
whether it is described as temporary or permanent and whether it features a legally-binding agreement or not. 86 
There may be other domestic and international factors affecting the stability of various agreements, but we do not 87 
consider these here for reasons of space and parsimony.  88 
  89 
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Source: authors’ elaboration. 109 
Notes: The various arrangements are considered for Great Britain (GB) only. The EU27 have so far insisted that to 110 
preserve an open border in Northern Ireland, different arrangements may have to apply to this part of the UK, as 111 
operationalised in the ‘backstop’ included in the Withdrawal Agreement (WA). 112 
Figure 1. The level of economic integration and stability of the EU-GB economic relationship 113 
Figure 1 maps several of the mooted options for a future EU-UK relationship in terms of these two dimensions. The 114 
bottom left quadrant inhabited by ‘No Deal’ gives us the least stability. It is not intended to be permanent and it 115 
would entail no agreement between the EU and UK, pace talk of a ‘managed No Deal’. It also gives us the least 116 
economic alignment, with trade taking place on the ‘most-favoured-nation’ terms available to the entirety of the 117 
World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. In contrast, the top-right quadrant inhabited by the European 118 
Economic Area (EEA) (+) option would be the most stable and economically integrated arrangement. It would 119 
involve either just membership of the EEA – short-hand for the Single Market – or membership supplemented with a 120 
full customs union (EEA+). In between these two options lies the ‘backstop’ option in the EU-UK WA, which would 121 
entail a customs union between GB and the EU with some ‘level playing field’ provisions on ‘flanking policies’ 122 
covering state aid, the environment and labour rights. The backstop would provide a medium degree of economic 123 
integration only for goods. Despite its formally open-ended nature it is described as being merely an insurance policy 124 
or, at the very most, a temporary measure until it can be ‘superseded’ by a ‘subsequent agreement’ (Article 2 of the 125 
Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland). The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) option, in turn, 126 
would involve a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) such as the one between the EU and Canada – or with supplemental 127 
liberalisation provisions (CETA +) (albeit for GB only, see Figure 1 Notes). This implies a comparatively lower degree 128 
of integration, but on a more stable footing. Finally, the ‘transition period’ would be the most economically 129 
integrated of the options but is only intended to be temporary; the Withdrawal Agreement stipulates an end date of 130 
December 2020, with a possible extension of one or two years. Alternatively, Brexit could at the time of writing also 131 
entail a further, supposedly temporary extension of the Article 50 process lasting anything from a few months to 132 
several years. 133 
Figure 1 forces us to consider not just an end state of EU-UK talks on a Future Economic Partnership but also the 134 
process of arriving there. It factors in the instability of potentially enduring arrangements intended for the ‘interim’ 135 
or as ‘insurance’, namely the transition and the backstop. The few static analyses of Brexit’s impact on EU trade 136 
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policy that we consider next have, however, largely focused on simply subtracting the UK variable from the EU 137 
equation (Jensen & Snaith, 2018, p. 255), without considering how actors might dynamically adjust their behaviour, 138 
especially given such uncertainty. We return to this issue in section 4. 139 
3. The ‘Static’ Effects of Brexit on EU Trade Policy 140 
3.1. Institutional Factors 141 
Focusing on static effects, several scholars have re-stated the conventional wisdom that Brexit could push the EU in 142 
a less liberal direction due to a shift in the balance of power between different institutional actors within its trade 143 
policy machinery (Jensen & Snaith, 2018, p. 262; Jacobs, 2018, pp. 109-110; Larsen, 2018, p. 225). The loss of a 144 
traditionally liberal Member State, and its votes in the Council, is seen as ‘mov[ing] the centre of gravity towards the 145 
more protectionist countries in the EU’ (Larsen, 2018, p. 225). Such views would be consistent with seeing the so-146 
called ‘protectionist Southern bloc’ of France, Italy and Spain gaining in prominence (see Zimmermann, 2019, p. 10).  147 
Existing research based on recorded votes in the area of trade defence has shown that the UK has been amongst the 148 
Member States most frequently opposed to anti-dumping duties (Evenett & Vermulst, 2005, pp. 711-712; Nielsen & 149 
Svendsen, 2012, pp. 203-204). The UK has not had the most liberal voting record, as Scandinavian countries and the 150 
Netherlands have opposed anti-dumping measures even more consistently. But the departing Member State has 151 
been the key opponent of anti-dumping duties when assessed based on its relative weight. Representing 12.9 per 152 
cent of the current EU population, the UK’s vote is much more significant than the share of Scandinavian and Dutch 153 
votes combined (7.55 per cent of the EU population; data from Council of the EU 2019).  154 
As Hubert Zimmermann (2019, p. 10) notes, and the importance of relative vote shares begins to suggest, simply 155 
focusing on ‘binary’ depictions of ‘free traders vs. protectionists neglects the complex process in which trade 156 
decisions are reached in the European Union’. Adopting a rational choice institutionalist approach focused on 157 
decision-making practices suggests that UK departure is thus less likely to have a major impact. Zimmermann (2019, 158 
p. 10) broadly shares Alasdair Young’s (2017b, p. 6) conclusion that Brexit’s impact on the balance within the Council 159 
‘is unlikely to be very consequential’. This is even more relevant in areas other than trade defence, where formal 160 
voting in the Council is less common (see Woolcock, 2015, p. 401). In particular, and as Young (2017b, p. 6) 161 
highlights, decisions on trade negotiations are conducted ‘on the basis of consensus (and for mixed agreements in 162 
the shadow of ratification by all member states)’ (see also De Bièvre, 2018, p. 79). 163 
Turning to inter-institutional battles, Henrik Larsen (2018, p. 225) has argued that Brexit may potentially facilitate 164 
the liberal Commission’s role in trade policy by removing a sovereignty-conscious Member State from the Council. 165 
That said, the UK’s position on the most recent EU trade policy competence battle over investor protection suggests 166 
that its role in constraining liberal, supranational trade and investment policies may be overstated. The UK was in 167 
the camp of Member States that supported the continued inclusion of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 168 
during the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations (Oliver & Spiegel, 2014).  169 
Less discussed has been the role of the European Parliament (EP). The Parliament has been an increasingly 170 
‘assertive’ actor within EU trade policymaking since the Treaty of Lisbon and, especially, the TTIP negotiations 171 
(Roederer-Rynning, 2017). Zimmermann (2019, p. 11) draws a counterintuitive conclusion. Despite the loss of 172 
generally pro-liberalisation Labour and Conservative MEPs, with Labour playing a key role thanks to the king making 173 
position of the Group of Socialists & Democrats, the significant presence of UKIP in recent years has meant that the 174 
UK’s MEPs expressed a more critical view of trade liberalisation than the EP as a whole (Zimmermann, 2019, pp. 12-175 
14). Analysing 13 votes between 2015-1017 Zimmermann has found that in 10 cases the votes of the UK delegation 176 
were considerably more ‘sceptical’ of trade liberalisation than the Parliament as a whole. This was on key issues such 177 
as the TTIP negotiations, the approval of CETA, the opening of negotiations with Australia and New Zealand and talks 178 
at the WTO. On the other hand, of the UK’s 73 seats in the EP, only 27 will be redistributed amongst other Member 179 
States if and when Brexit occurs. This includes a gain of 5 for France and Spain each, 3 for Italy and only 6 in total for 180 
the ‘Northern European coalition’ countries (Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Finland) (EP, 2018). This 181 
redistribution of seats has led VoteWatch Europe (2018, emphasis omitted) to conclude, on the basis of nationally-182 
based voting patterns on trade which mirror those of Member States in the Council, that ‘protectionist forces are 183 
likely to gain more influence in the new European Parliament’. In sum, given that these factors point in opposing 184 
directions and that there is a comparatively small number of MEPs involved, the expectation might be that there is 185 
likely to be little change post-Brexit in the EP. 186 
3.2. Market Size and the Domestic Configuration of Interests 187 
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While static analyses have thus emphasised a possible, albeit limited, anti-liberalisation shift in the institutional 188 
balance of power as a result of Brexit, several authors have suggested that it will have a significant impact on the 189 
EU’s market size and consequent negotiating leverage (Young, 2017a, p. 112; Young, 2017b, p. 6; Khorana & García, 190 
2018, pp. 9-10; Jensen & Snaith,  2018, p. 262). The UK represents 16 per cent of the GDP of the Union. As a result, 191 
some have argued that the EU will become less prone to make the more onerous concessions likely to be asked of it 192 
in order to secure trade agreements (Young, 2017a, p. 112). Others have suggested that the EU could become more 193 
commercially minded and less likely to leverage market access to achieve other foreign policy objectives (Khorana & 194 
García, 2018, p. 10). 195 
What of the UK as a component of the EU’s trade and what this says about the post-Brexit configuration of interests 196 
in the EU? Figure 2 shows the revealed comparative advantage in goods and services of the UK relative to the EU, 197 
using data from 2017. This is calculated by dividing the share of total exports of a certain goods or services category 198 
for the UK by the share of total exports for that same category for the EU28. It illustrates the relative specialisation 199 
of the UK’s goods and services exports compared to the EU as a whole, with a value above 1 indicating that the UK is 200 
relatively more specialised in a particular sector. Our analysis, which is in line with an earlier UK Government study 201 
based on data for 2010 (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, 2012), demonstrates that the UK is 202 
predominantly specialised in services exports, notably insurance, pension and (other) financial services. The UK 203 
exports relatively few primary products – such as agricultural goods or minerals – or lower-skill manufactured 204 
products – such as textiles and clothing or metal products.  205 
 206 
Sources: authors’ calculations based on data from UN Comtrade for international trade in goods (using WITS 207 
software) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development for international trade in services.  208 
Figure 2. UK revealed comparative advantage relative to the EU28 (2017) 209 
This overall pattern of specialisation is also reflected in the overall negative balance for trade in manufacturers 210 
(Perraton & Spreafico, 2019). Although some manufacturing, such as motor vehicles, has benefitted from substantial 211 
inward investment, this has often been focused on assembly in transnational supply chains – with low domestically 212 
manufactured content (Berry, 2016, pp. 38-39; Froud, Johal, Law, Leaver & Williams, 2011, pp. 30-31). This economic 213 
structure has been actively promoted by successive UK Governments through an ‘Anglo-liberal’ growth model (see 214 
Hay, 2011). Scott Lavery, Lucia Quaglia & Charlie Dannreuther (2019, p. 253) have highlighted how the ‘UK economy 215 
is underpinned by a distinctive “national business model”, organised around a dominant financial sector, flexible 216 
labour market, service-led growth and openness to international capital flows’.  217 
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While such analyses might underplay the interplay between goods and services in the UK’s (and other countries’) 218 
exports often highlighted in economic and policy debates (e.g. Cernat & Kutlina-Dimitrova, 2014; International Trade 219 
Committee, 2019), they still point to the comparatively prominent role that promoting (financial) services and 220 
certain types of inward investment have played in shaping government decision-making. UK services interests have 221 
also been well-represented in the EU’s trade policy by both the UK Government and the European Commission (van 222 
Loon, 2018; Lietaert, 2009). With Brexit, a static analysis based on subtracting the UK from the EU might therefore 223 
suggest that the EU will be less interested in pursuing external services liberalisation than it has been to date. 224 
Instead, it would be more driven by the interests of its industrial and agricultural sectors, whose interests will be 225 
more likely to vary depending on the trade partner concerned (on the UK’s role as a driver of liberalisation in 226 
agricultural trade, see Roederer-Rynning & Matthews, this issue). That said, one persistent area of UK defensiveness 227 
in services and investment negotiations in recent years has been the issue of GATS ‘mode 4’ services liberalisation, 228 
the natural movement of persons to deliver a service, given its association with immigration policy. This was one of 229 
the key stumbling blocks in FTA negotiations with India (see Siles-Brügge, 2013, pp. 608-609). These tensions in the 230 
British position in respect of trade in services are further grist to the mill that as a Member State the UK has acted as 231 
a ‘pivotal outlier’ in shaping EU policy positions (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, this issue). 232 
4. Towards a More ‘Dynamic’ View of Brexit’s Effects on EU Trade Policy 233 
The only ‘known known’ about Brexit, assuming it does occur, is the fact that the UK will lose formal representation 234 
in the EU Institutions. Even if there is an extension to the Article 50 period the UK and its representatives in the 235 
Council and EP will have lost much of their leverage in internal negotiations, in what De Ville & Siles-Brügge (this 236 
issue) call ‘anticipatory adjustment’. Static analysis might therefore seem appropriate to studying the impact that 237 
Brexit has on the institutions of EU trade policy. As noted above, these explanations suggest limited change in a 238 
potentially more protectionist direction. Even here, however, Brexit may be a source of dynamic trade policy 239 
impacts. For one, the UK may benefit from new institutional mechanisms that afford it indirect influence in EU trade 240 
policy. This could go from formalised consultation mechanisms if it was part of a customs union (Lowe, 2018a) to 241 
influence on the EU’s domestic regulations via formalised regulatory cooperation processes (see De Ville & Siles-242 
Brügge, 2016). Existing precedents suggest that the latter is much more likely than the former. Secondly, Brexit can 243 
lead to the reconfiguration of voting coalitions in the EU Institutions. Notably, following the EU referendum, the 244 
‘New Hanseatic League’ has emerged as a Member State coalition composed of the fiscally-conservative and pro-245 
liberalisation Netherlands, Ireland, Nordic and Baltic states. It aims to counterbalance the strengthened and less 246 
economically liberal Franco-German axis (see Khan, 2018). 247 
More generally, and as the discussion in section 2 highlighted, assessing Brexit’s impact is not simply a question of 248 
subtracting the UK’s market size and economic interests from that of the EU’s. Rather, we must consider how the 249 
negotiation of a future economic arrangement could unfold and the impact this process has on the behaviour of 250 
relevant actors, including firms.  251 
4.1. The Dynamics of Relocation 252 
The behaviour of economic operators is likely to have an important impact by reshaping the EU’s domestic 253 
configuration of interests. Taking a dynamic approach to the question of the (re)configuration of EU interests leads 254 
us to focus on how the Brexit process shapes the degree to which UK-based firms offshore their production/service-255 
delivery to the EU27. This is because the UK would face considerable difficulties pursuing an even more low-tax/low-256 
regulation business model as a means of retaining/attracting investment (Seabrooke & Wigan, 2017). While more 257 
alignment (the right-most quadrants of Figure 1) would on its own imply less movement of UK-based firms and 258 
investment to the EU, this is not the only factor at play. Ceteris paribus, a less stable arrangement (the bottom 259 
quadrants of Figure 1) would imply more offshoring from the UK to the EU given increased uncertainty over the 260 
future arrangement.  261 
There is already evidence of referendum-induced uncertainty leading to this kind of anticipatory adjustment in the 262 
investment decisions of firms. For one, there has been evidence of reduced investment in the UK. One 2018 study 263 
using the fDi Markets database, which focuses on greenfield FDI, estimated that the number of FDI projects in the 264 
UK declined by 16-20 per cent with respect to what might have been expected without the vote for Brexit. The 265 
authors also found that inward services FDI flows declined the most (by 25 per cent), potentially pointing to the 266 
‘sunk’ nature of investments in manufacturing (Serwicka & Tamberi, 2018, p. 1). In addition, there is also evidence of 267 
such reduced investment being a sign of the offshoring of economic activities from the UK to the EU27. Counting 268 
both mergers and acquisitions and greenfield activity, a 2019 study estimated that the Brexit vote had led not only 269 
to an 11 per cent decline in UK inward investment flows from the EU27, but also to an increase of 12 per cent in 270 
investment by UK firms in the EU27. This increase in investment by UK firms came ‘entirely from higher investment 271 
by the services sector’ (Breinlich, Leromain, Novy & Sampson, 2019, p. 2). More recent analysis of data from the fDi 272 
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Markets database by the Financial Times has also found evidence of FDI flows not only declining, but also shifting 273 
from the UK to the EU27. In the three years to the first quarter of 2019 greenfield FDI flows into the EU27 increased 274 
by 43 per cent compared to the previous three-year period (Q1 2013-Q1 2016). The UK, in turn, experienced a 30 275 
per cent decline. Of the 474,000 EU27 additional jobs created over this period compared to the previous three years, 276 
53,000 were said to come from UK companies investing in the EU (Romei & Jackson, 2019). 277 
The ultimate impact of any reconfiguration of interests, of course, will vary between sectors and the specifics of the 278 
different post-Brexit EU-UK arrangements. Additionally, as Egan (this issue) highlights, the degree of integration 279 
across the EU’s Single Market varies, including between goods and services. Given the UK’s political economic model 280 
(see above), two groups stand out as being particularly likely to relocate in the event of a hard Brexit and/or 281 
prolonged uncertainty. Firstly, there are those firms most reliant on EU ‘freedoms’ to deliver cross-border services. 282 
Cross-border activities feature much more prominently as a mode of supply for UK firms exporting services to the 283 
EU27 than to the rest of the world (Lowe, 2018b, pp. 10-11). This includes, but is not limited to, financial services 284 
firms making use of ‘passporting’ arrangements. These are likely to relocate at least some of their activities to the 285 
EU27 (Howarth & Quaglia, 2017, p. 161; Zimmermann, 2019, pp. 6-7). One estimate from consultancy EY puts the 286 
number of City jobs to move to the EU27 at around 7000 (Morris, 2019). The second group of highly affected 287 
business is that of firms in manufacturing supply chains reliant on ‘just in time production’ such as a the automotive, 288 
aerospace and pharmaceutical sectors. These are likely to be hit by the end of ‘frictionless trade’ (see Egan, this 289 
issue). Given the sunk nature of investments in manufacturing, this might mean relocation is delayed when 290 
compared to services, as the data above suggests, but still more likely to happen in the event of prolonged 291 
uncertainty or a harder Brexit. For example, inward investment flows in the UK automotive sector already halved 292 
between 2017 and 2018 (Hotten, 2019). Of the permanent options in Figure 1 above, only the EEA+ would 293 
potentially preserve frictionless trade for manufacturers. An FTA would entail regulatory and customs checks for 294 
compliance with rules of origin requirements and the backstop customs union, at least on its own, would entail not 295 
just regulatory checks but also paperwork to certify that goods were eligible for free circulation. 296 
Offshoring from the UK to the EU27 would interact with the only certainty of Brexit, a loss of UK votes in the EU 297 
Institutions, or a significant lessening of the influence of British representatives in the case of an Article 50 298 
extension. We might expect an outcome in the top-right quadrant of Figure 1 such as the EEA(+) to imply the least 299 
change to the EU’s trade policy as the EU’s market size would be unaffected. However, it would also lessen the 300 
pressure for firms to relocate both because of continued alignment and reduced uncertainty. As a result, it would 301 
also be the most likely to change the EU27’s internal balance of interests. Given no formal UK involvement in EU 302 
trade policymaking, those firms present in the EU27 and thus represented by the Member States, MEPs and through 303 
European/national lobby groups would change with respect to the pre-Brexit situation. The UK’s services and 304 
global/regional value chain-reliant manufacturing exporters would no longer be directly represented. These 305 
interests have contributed to rendering the UK a liberal ‘pivotal outlier’ in EU trade policy in the past. This might 306 
suggest less of a willingness on behalf of the EU to make market access concessions in areas such as agriculture or 307 
import-competing manufacturing, given that these interests would gain in relative representation. Meanwhile, the 308 
EU27 would still be able to offer access to the UK market given customs and regulatory alignment.  309 
That said, under a softer Brexit, levels of interdependence between EU27 and UK firms would likely remain high. 310 
Existing supply chains are more likely to be preserved, contributing to continued high levels of intra-firm trade and 311 
investment flows between both parties. The political effects of this might be to encourage alignment in the positions 312 
on trade policy adopted by some EU27 and UK economic interests as occurred during the EU-US TTIP negotiations. 313 
Here businesses formed transatlantic alliances to lobby in favour of the agreement as a result of the high levels of 314 
economic interpenetration across the Atlantic (Young, 2017a, pp. 57-59). This might mitigate some of the anti-315 
liberalisation effects of a reduced presence of pro-liberalisation economic actors in the EU27 – albeit likely not all 316 
given the UK’s outlying role in EU trade policymaking.  317 
Such ‘21st century trade politics’ (Young & Peterson, 2014) is premised on the very economic interdependence 318 
driving business relocation in the event of a harder Brexit or prolonged uncertainty (the outcomes in the left and 319 
bottom quadrants of Figure 1). As firms plugged into regional and global supply chains – and/or otherwise 320 
interdependent with European and global firms – relocate to the Union, the balance of views represented within the 321 
EU27 in such a scenario would be less likely to change significantly than in the event of a soft or more certain Brexit.  322 
There remains the question of how any relocated foreign investments or external business actors would be viewed 323 
politically in the EU, particularly following concerns in Member States over Chinese investment in debates over 324 
investment screening (Meunier, 2014) or US investment in the negotiations concerning investor protection in TTIP 325 
(Siles-Brügge, 2017). In the UK, meanwhile, business concerns have been largely side-lined in the internal battles 326 
over the future EU-UK arrangements (see, for example, James & Quaglia, 2019). EU trade policy, however, is in a 327 
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very different state to UK politics, sovereignty-based concerns over inward investment notwithstanding. As section 5 328 
will illustrate, the European Commission continues to be a predominantly liberal trade policy actor. It remains 329 
committed to the sentiment expressed in its most recent trade strategy (‘Trade for All’ from 2015) that investment 330 
and global value chains are key to EU prosperity (European Commission 2015, p. 9). The Commission also has a 331 
history of seeking support from exporters in pushing for trade liberalisation, even helping with the establishment of 332 
a European-level services lobby group, the European Services Forum (Lietaert, 2009, pp. 12-17). While it therefore 333 
remains to be seen what influence any relocated investors wield within EU trade policymaking, there is a strong 334 
chance they will strengthen the hands of those pushing for a liberal trade policy. This is particularly the case if Brexit 335 
is successfully framed as an illegitimate, protectionist step – as appears to be occurring (see section 5). Certain EU 336 
Member States have also been very vocally courting the relocation of UK businesses (e.g. in financial services). 337 
In sum, continued interdependence (in the event of a soft Brexit/less uncertainty) and/or relocation (in the event of 338 
a hard Brexit/more uncertainty) are likely to mean pro-liberalisation interests continue having an important 339 
presence in the EU regardless of the shape of post-Brexit arrangements. The exact pattern of relocation will depend 340 
not just on the final outcome but on the ongoing Brexit process underpinned by uncertainty, underscoring the 341 
importance of focusing on dynamic, rather than static, impacts.  342 
4.2. International Negotiating Dynamics 343 
Figure 1 also provides some guidance as to the dynamic effects that Brexit might have on the EU’s international 344 
negotiating leverage. For one, the size of the EU’s market may well not shrink in the case of outcomes in the right-345 
most quadrants. This would help to maintain the EU’s direct ‘market power’ (Damro, 2012) and the indirect power 346 
of the ‘Brussels effect’ where EU market rules are unilaterally adopted by third parties (Bradford, 2012). However, 347 
this may be as a result of inherently unstable arrangements that nevertheless diminish EU negotiating leverage, such 348 
as in the cases of an on-going transition, backstop or Article 50 extension. Moreover, EU negotiating capital will have 349 
to be expended clarifying the EU27’s schedules at the WTO (on the foreign policy consequences of these 350 
negotiations, see Smith, this issue). This will not only be the case for arrangements in the left-most quadrants, but 351 
also for supposedly temporary outcomes such as the proposed transition/Article 50 extension. It is especially 352 
relevant for tariff-rate quotas for sensitive goods such as agricultural and fisheries products, which will need to be 353 
reapportioned between the EU27 and the UK post-Brexit. This issue potentially also arises in the context of the EU’s 354 
existing FTAs with third parties. The EU may wish to re-open discussions in order to not have to absorb an existing 355 
quota entitlement negotiated while the UK was still a member (International Trade Committee, 2018, pp. 19-20). 356 
Meanwhile, the greater and more stable the degree of economic alignment between the UK and the EU, the less 357 
likely the UK is to emerge as a trade policy competitor vying for market access with the EU, insofar as any 358 
independent trade policy competence is constrained. This dynamic is particularly relevant in the area of services and 359 
investment liberalisation where there are ‘first-mover’ advantages (see Manger, 2009). 360 
Having considered one set of dynamic effects that are dependent not only on the future EU-UK arrangement but 361 
also on the process of arriving there, we now turn to the discursive impact that Brexit is already having on EU trade 362 
policy since the referendum. 363 
5. Brexit’s Impact on EU Trade Discourse and Practice So Far: Reinforcing the Status Quo 364 
EU trade discourse and practice has been characterised as following a broadly liberal trajectory, certainly since the 365 
early 1990s (see De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2018). This liberal core of EU trade policy has been complemented by two 366 
other elements. The first has been a stress on the need to protect EU firms and workers against ‘unfair trade’, in part 367 
to maintain domestic support for trade liberalisation (see Bollen, De Ville & Orbie, 2016). The second has been an 368 
ambition to use trade policy as a foreign policy instrument (see Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006; Young & Peterson, 369 
2014).  370 
For long, this essentially liberal position was relatively uncontested. This changed with the EU-US TTIP negotiations, 371 
which resulted in ‘unprecedented debate’ on trade policy within the EU (see De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2016). The 372 
contestation of trade policy led the Commission to make some changes to both substance and process, notably with 373 
respect to investor protection and transparency (see Gheyle & De Ville, 2017; Siles-Brügge, 2017). In its most recent 374 
trade policy strategy ‘Trade for All’ dating from October 2015, the Commission recognised that it had to ‘[adapt] its 375 
approach to trade policy to take all of these lessons [from TTIP] on board’ (European Commission, 2015, p. 5). 376 
However, notwithstanding the more balanced tone about the objectives of trade policy, the new strategy was hardly 377 
revolutionary. In line with the EU’s trade policy trajectory since the 1990s, it continued advocating trade 378 
liberalisation. This was described as even more important given the rise of ‘global value chains’, which are 379 
mentioned no fewer than fourteen times in the document. In the words of the Commission ‘[g]lobal value chains 380 
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mean trade policy can no longer be approached from a narrow mercantilist angle’ (European Commission, 2015, p. 381 
10).  382 
Hence, in the run-up to the Brexit referendum the EU’s ‘broadly liberal’ trade policy had been significantly 383 
challenged in the context of the TTIP negotiations – but not been radically altered in response. Advocates of the EU’s 384 
liberal trade policy orientation succeeded in framing the contestation of TTIP as demonstrating the need for better 385 
communication regarding the benefits of free trade agreements and for limited procedural and substantive changes. 386 
Would the UK’s referendum outcome destabilise the EU’s long-standing trade policy position more fundamentally?  387 
As De Ville & Siles-Brügge underscore in the Introduction to this Special Issue, a discursive struggle on how to 388 
interpret Brexit has not only quickly kicked off in the UK but also in the remaining EU27. In March 2017, the 389 
European Commission weighed in on this debate through its ‘White paper on the future of Europe’ in which it 390 
outlined five possible scenarios for the EU27 (European Commission, 2017a). This was followed by five thematic 391 
reflection papers. The reflection paper on ‘Harnessing Globalisation’ is primarily concerned with the future of EU 392 
trade policy (European Commission, 2017b). Rather than framing Brexit as a development requiring a fundamental 393 
rethink of trade policy – for example, by gearing it much more towards protecting the ‘losers of globalisation’ – it is 394 
very much in line with the EU’s pre-referendum ‘Trade for All’ strategy.  395 
The paper starts by emphasising that while globalisation brings challenges ‘it is a positive force for change’ 396 
(European Commission, 2017b, p. 7). While it subsequently argues that the EU should do more to ensure that trade 397 
is not only free but also fair, this should not be read as a change of policy direction. Rather, it is fully in line with the 398 
EU’s long-held position that trade liberalisation needs to be accompanied with efforts to ensure that European firms 399 
and workers can compete on a level-playing field, in order to maintain sufficient domestic support for liberalisation. 400 
In its final section, the paper places the responsibility for ensuring a fairer distribution of the benefits of trade 401 
squarely in the hands of Member State governments, while reminding them of the need to make Europe more 402 
competitive. Strikingly, in contrast with the White Paper and the other reflection papers, ‘Harnessing Globalisation’ 403 
does not present alternative scenarios for the future conduct of EU trade policy for stakeholders and decision-404 
makers to choose between. The European Commission does not appear to view Brexit as a reason to fundamentally 405 
question, let alone alter, its trade strategy. On the contrary, the paper outlines a strong defence of the EU’s 406 
traditionally liberal trade policy against the ‘temptations of isolationism’ (European Commission, 2017d, p. 12), 407 
making a clear reference to Brexit and to the ‘America First’ trade policy of the then recently-inaugurated US 408 
President Donald Trump.  409 
The impact of Brexit on the trade discourse and practice of the EU is difficult to disentangle from the coterminous 410 
influence of Trump. That said, the two are often taken together by European trade policymakers as mutually 411 
reinforcing signs of a populist and isolationist trend that the EU should resist. They have also been jointly framed as 412 
illustrating the need for the Union to become an even more passionate global leader regarding ‘free trade’.  On the 413 
occasion of the 2017 State of the EU, EU Trade Commissioner Malmström has said that ‘[t]he world needs leaders in 414 
trade. The EU continues to champion free and fair trade, at the forefront of a group of like-minded countries’ 415 
(European Commission, 2017c). In a speech at Humboldt University the following year, she stated that, in response 416 
to Brexit and Trump, ‘[w]e made clear where we stand – progressive, open global traders. Responsible traders. Since 417 
flying that flag, countries have [sic] are lining up with us, and our trade agenda has never been busier’ (Malmström, 418 
2018). In sum, Brexit and Trump have not been interpreted by the Commission as a call to rethink the liberal 419 
orientation of EU trade policy. 420 
Underscoring these discursive moves, we have also seen a continuation and strengthening of the EU’s liberal trade 421 
policy in practice. The Brexit vote has not prevented the conclusion of several trade agreements that were already in 422 
the pipeline, such as with Canada, Japan, Vietnam and Singapore. The framing of the referendum result and the 423 
election of Trump have put opponents of EU trade agreements in an uncomfortable position, making it more difficult 424 
for them to legitimately contest EU trade policies. Since Brexit, observers have reframed political conflict along a 425 
‘new political divide’ between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ positions, thereby putting critics of trade agreements – including 426 
progressives – in the same camp as cultural nationalists such as Trump or some UK leavers (see The Economist, 2016; 427 
Siles-Brügge 2017). Besides concluding trade agreements that had been long in the making, negotiations on new 428 
trade agreements – or to ‘modernise’ existing trade agreements – have also been (re-)launched since the 429 
referendum with partners such as Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand and Chile. Moreover, at the time of writing 430 
‘agreements in principle’ have been reached on the modernisation of EU-Mexico trade agreement and on a new FTA 431 
with Mercosur. Talks on these were only (re-)launched shortly before the referendum in May 2016 (European 432 
Commission, 2019a, 2019b). Finally, the Commission has even proposed (and the Council subsequently approved) 433 
re-opening limited trade talks with the US to stave off a trade war, despite a commitment made by several key EU 434 
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actors including the French Government and Malmström to only negotiate trade agreements with parties to the 435 
Paris Climate Change Agreement (Beattie, 2019; European Commission, 2019c).      436 
To conclude, in the period since Brexit, we have not seen a protectionist shift in the EU’s trade discourse or policies, 437 
but rather a strengthening of its traditional liberal orientation. The European Commission has legitimised further 438 
liberalisation efforts by arguing that, now more than ever, the EU needs to be a defender of free trade that rejects 439 
the temptations of protectionism.  440 
6. Conclusion 441 
In this article, we have discussed the potential impacts of Brexit on EU trade policy. The conventional wisdom has 442 
been that the UK’s withdrawal will push the EU in a less liberal policy direction. We have argued that this 443 
expectation is based on an unduly static analysis of the consequences of Brexit. We cannot simply subtract UK 444 
representation from the EU when considering the impact of Brexit on this policy area as there are several dynamic 445 
factors that might affect EU trade policy going forward. First, there is the uncertainty about the future EU-UK 446 
relationship. This affects how both institutional and societal actors respond strategically to Brexit, for example by 447 
relocating their economic activities or reconsidering their alliances or positions within EU institutions. Second, there 448 
is the matter of how Brexit is diagnosed, and how this legitimates different EU trade policy responses. Even if Brexit 449 
does not ultimately occur, the dynamic effects of uncertainty will still have had an impact. 450 
Brexit may shape EU trade policy in counterintuitive ways. For example, a soft Brexit outcome, where the UK 451 
remains de facto in the Single Market and Customs Union while losing influence over EU decision-making, could 452 
change EU trade policy more than a hard Brexit. In the case of the former, EU leverage in trade negotiations would 453 
remain unchanged, while we might expect little relocation by UK firms which would no longer be represented by the 454 
EU in trade policy. Consequently, the EU’s position could become somewhat less liberal. There might be less of a 455 
willingness to sacrifice defensive interests – such as agriculture – in order to secure offensive gains in business or 456 
financial services, with the EU retaining a similar amount of market power to defend this position. That said, this 457 
effect might be mitigated by high levels of interdependence between EU27 and UK firms. This might lead them to 458 
adopt similar positions on trade policy. A hard Brexit, meanwhile, is less likely to lead to changes in the EU’s trade 459 
policy position, as firms dependent on regional and global economic integration are more likely to relocate to the 460 
EU. Cross-border service suppliers and manufacturing in transnational supply chains would retain representation in 461 
EU trade policy. All in all, whether because of continued interdependence or relocation, key pro-liberalisation 462 
interests will continue influencing EU trade policy post-Brexit. This is contrary to the expectation that Brexit will 463 
necessarily push the EU in a more protectionist direction. 464 
Studying the response of EU trade policy since the referendum shows us that so far, no radical change has 465 
materialised. The EU has continued its traditional position of progressive liberalisation in discourse and practice. 466 
Rather than interpreting Brexit as a sign that EU trade policy needs a fundamental rethink, the European 467 
Commission has framed it as demonstrating the need to ‘hold the line’. The Commission has even used Brexit, and 468 
the reinforcing presence of Donald Trump, to portray itself as the champion of global free trade.  469 
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